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1 Abstract
We derive valuations of a portfolio of financial instruments from a securities lending perspective, under
different assumptions, and show a weighting scheme that converges to the true valuation. This valuation
can be useful either to derive a bidding strategy for an exclusive auction or to design an appropriate auction
mechanism, depending on which side of the fence a participant sits (whether the interest is to procure the
rights to use a portfolio for making stock loans such as for a lending desk, or, to obtain additional revenue from
a portfolio such as from the point of view of a long only asset management firm). Lastly, we run simulations
to establish numerical examples for the set of valuations and for various bidding strategies corresponding to
different auction settings.
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2 Securities Lending Background
Securities Lending began as an informal practice among brokers who had insufficient share certificates to
settle their sold bargains, commonly because their selling clients had misplaced their certificates or just not
provided them to the broker by the settlement date of the transaction. Once the broker had received the
certificates, they would be passed on to the lending broker. This arrangement was not subject to any formal
agreements and there was no exchange of collateral. Today, securities lending is a significant market practice
whereby securities are temporarily transferred by one party, (the lender) to another (the borrower). The
borrower is obliged to return the securities to the lender, either on demand or at the end of any agreed term.
For the period of the loan, the lender is secured by acceptable assets or cash of equal or greater value than
the lent securities, delivered by the borrower to the lender, as collateral. With such simple beginnings, today
the business generates hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue and involves the movement of trillions of
dollars’ worth of financial instruments. The Over-The-Counter (OTC) nature of the business means that is
hard to come up with actual numbers in terms of size and profitability, but we provide some estimates in
section 4.1.
Below we chronicle various circumstances that lead to the demand for securities loans.
1. Market making and proprietary trading
• The most common reason to borrow securities is to cover a short position using the borrowed
securities to settle an outright sale. But this is rarely a simple speculative bet that the value of a
security will fall, so that the borrower can buy it more cheaply at the maturity of the loan. More
commonly, the short position is part of a larger trading strategy, typically designed to profit from
perceived pricing discrepancies between related securities. Some examples are:
– Convertible bond arbitrage: buying a convertible bond and simultaneously selling the under-
lying equity short.
– ‘Pairs’ trading: seeking to identify two companies, with similar characteristics, whose equity
securities are currently trading at a price relationship that is out of line with the historical
trading range. The apparently undervalued security is bought, while the apparently overvalued
security is sold short.
– Merger arbitrage: for example, selling short the equities of a company making a takeover bid
against a long position in those of the potential acquisition company.
– Index arbitrage: selling short the constituent securities of an equity price index against a long
position in the corresponding index future.
– Other market making and proprietary trading related activities that require borrowing secu-
rities include equity / derivative arbitrage, and equity option hedging.
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2. Borrowing for Failed Trades
• A failed trade may be defined as one where delivery cannot be completed because of insufficient
securities available. This is not deliberate policy, but is caused by any number of general admin-
istrative problems. Borrowings to cover fails are mostly small and short in duration (one to five
days). The borrower keeps the loan open only until he can complete delivery of the underlying
trade. An example of this type of transaction occurs when a broker’s client sells stock, but fails
to deliver the securities to his broker. The broker borrows the stock, settles the trade and places
the resultant settlement funds on deposit. He thereby earns interest on this cash and avoids fail
fines. He then unwinds the loan once the client has delivered his securities.
3. Borrowing for Margin Requirements.
• To meet margin requirements, for example at the exchange traded options market, securities can
be borrowed cheaply and lodged as margin, rather than depositing cash.
4. Temporary Transfer of Ownership
• Another large class of transactions not involving a short is motivated by lending to transfer own-
ership temporarily to the advantage of both lender and borrower. For example, where a lender
would be subject to withholding tax on dividends or interest but some potential borrowers are not.
Subject to the possible application of any relevant specific or general anti-avoidance tax provisions
or principles, the borrower receives the dividend free of tax and shares some of the benefit with
the lender in the form of a larger fee or larger manufactured dividend.
Security loans drawn down by market makers and traders on equity instruments are typified as being large in
volume and long in duration. For lenders, these loans represent the greatest opportunity to maximize profit.
This is also the reason for referring to these business units as stock loan desks, even though they lend fixed
income securities, handle repurchase agreements, manage collateral and other securities borrowing related
activities.
The supply of securities into the lending market comes mainly from the portfolios of beneficial owners such
as pensions, insurance companies and other such funds. Majority of the funds or asset owners work through
agents or intermediary brokers. Intermediaries act between lenders and borrowers. For their services, the
intermediary takes a spread. Many institutions find it convenient to lend stock to one or two intermediaries
who then lend on to many more counter-parties. This saves administrative overheads and limits credit risks.
The spread is the result of a bargaining process between intermediary brokers and beneficial owners on one
side and between intermediary brokers and end borrowers on the other side.
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3 Our Innovations and their Necessity
Existing studies on securities lending fail to consider the full extent to which lending desks bridge the demand
and supply gap by setting loan rates and managing inventory by finding securities externally or using the
positions of other trading desks within the same firm (section 4.3 summarizes much of the existing literature
in this space, from which we see that the actions of the lending desks are mostly ignored). A more complete
study on the effects of short selling must look to incorporate the actions of the main players and how they
look to alter their cost structure or the demand/supply mechanisms, by pulling the above levers they have
at their disposal. In this paper and related works (Kashyap 2017), we derive various theoretical results that
consider the modus operandi of the players in the lending space and supplement the results with practical
considerations that can be operationally useful on a daily basis.
The securities lending business is a cash cow for brokerage firms. (D’Avolio 2002; Jones & Lamont 2002;
and Duffie, Garleanu, & Pedersen 2002) have details on the mechanics of the equity lending market; (End
notes 3 and 4) have further details on the historical evolution of securities lending. Lenders are assured of
a positive spread on every loan transaction they make. Historically, the loan rates were determined mostly
as a result of a bargaining process between parties taking the loan and traders on the securities lending
desks. Recent trends, due to increased competitive pressures among different players (lending desks and
other intermediaries), the introduction of various third party agents that provide information and advice to
beneficial owners (the actual asset owners who supply inventory to the lending desks), and the treatment
of securities lending as an investment management and trading discipline, have compressed the spreads
(difference between the rate at which lending desks acquire inventory and the rate at which they make loans)
and forced lending desks to look for ways to improve their profit margins.
To aid this effort at profitability, it is possible to develop different models to manage spreads on daily
securities loans and aid the price discovery process, improve the efficiency of the locate mechanism and
optimize the allocation of inventory, develop strategies for placing bids on exclusive auctions, price long term
loans as a contract with optionality embedded in it and also look at ways to benchmark which securities can
be considered to be more in demand or highly shorted and use this approach to estimate which securities are
potentially going to become “hot” or “special”, that is securities on which the loan rates can go up drastically
and supply can get constrained. (Kashyap 2016) looks at some of these recent innovations being used by
lending desks and also considers how these methodologies can be useful for both buy side and sell side
institutions (that is, for all the participants involved).
In this paper, we derive valuations of a portfolio of financial instruments from a securities
lending perspective. This valuation would reflect the value of the portfolio of securities if a
certain percentage of the holdings had to be borrowed to cover corresponding short positions.
The valuation exercise then becomes an effort at finding an annual rate to be paid to the actual
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owner of the portfolio of securities that are being offered as an exclusive. This value represents
the fees that the participant getting the use of the exclusive (usually securities lending desks)
hopes to earn by lending out the securities to their final end borrowers.
(Figure 1) is a typical exclusive arrangement showing how an intermediary (securities lending desk)
sits between an exclusive owner (long only asset manager) and final end borrowers (hedge funds, derivative
traders, market makers, etc.) who have short positions. The first portion of the figure (near the circle marked
one) shows the exclusive contract arranged between the intermediary and the long only asset manager. This
contract allows the intermediary exclusive use of the holdings of the asset manager for making stock loans.
In return for being able to use the holdings of the asset manager, the intermediary pays an annual fee. The
contract is usually made for a year (or multiple years in some instances) and the fees are fixed when the
contract is initiated. The second half of the figure (near the circle marked two) shows the securities from the
exclusive portfolio being used by the intermediary to make loans to the final end borrowers. The final end
borrowers pay the stock loan fee or the borrow costs which the intermediary can change the stock loan fee
on a daily basis. The stock loans to end borrowers are usually shorter in duration compared to the exclusive
contract.
Figure 1: Securities Lending Exclusive Arrangement
The first step (Figure 2; near the circle marked one) in the determination of the fixed fee paid by the
intermediary to the exclusive portfolio owner is the valuation of the portfolio. Section 4 has details on the
motivation for procuring such an exclusive contract and section 5 considers the valuation methodologies to
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arrive at a basis point estimate including various assumptions that would be realistic from a securities lending
point of view. The long only asset manager (or an agent of the asset manager) conducts an auction where
many interested intermediaries are invited to place bids for the holdings of the asset manager. Hence the
valuation obtained in the first step is shaded to suit the many possible auction formats (Figure 2; near the
circle marked two), which becomes the bidding strategy discussed in section 6. The winner of the auction
is awarded the exclusive contract and the fixed fee is based on the winning bid. Sometimes, the holdings
are distributed among a few of the top bidders and many rules are used to decide what fees apply and how
much of the holdings each bidder gets. It helpful to think of the valuation of the portfolio as the initial step
towards obtaining an auction bidding strategy which is the ultimate goal of the auction participants.
Figure 2: Securities Lending Exclusive Procurement
Example 1. For example, if a portfolio with notional value 1 Billion USD was being offered as an exclusive
contract via an auction. If a certain participant wishes to use this portfolio to lend to their end clients,
he would estimate an annual rate based on, among other things, the securities lending loan rates of all the
securities in that portfolio. Let us say the estimate turns out to be 25 basis points and the lending desk
makes this their bid (without changing the valuation) and wins the auction, the lending desk would then pay
2.5 million USD (1 Billion times 25 basis points) to the exclusive portfolio owner. This example has many
simplifying assumptions which are relaxed in the corresponding sections below.
Such a valuation of any portfolio of financial instruments can be useful either to derive a bidding strategy
for an exclusive auction or to design an appropriate exclusive auction mechanism, depending on which side of
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the fence a participant sits (whether the interest is to procure the rights to use a portfolio for making stock
loans such as for a lending desk, or, to obtain additional revenue from a portfolio such as from the point of
view of a long only asset management firm). The valuation of the portfolio being auctioned is subject to the
information set available to the bidder or the auction designer. This information set would include among
other things, the demand for the securities, any additional demand from the loan locates received (section 4
provides an explanation of the locate mechanism), the loan rates applicable to those securities, the duration
of the loans, the frequency of loan turnover and the internal inventory pool available to the bidder. Some
of these variables can be modeled as Geometric Brownian Motions (GBMs) with uncertainty introduced
via suitable log-normal distributions and certain others can be represented using folded asymmetric normal
distributions or by taking the absolute value of a normal distribution.
Different assumptions regarding the different variables would lead to different valuations. We derive
heuristics to arrive at a set of valuations, with a pecking order that can help decide the aggressiveness
regarding which of the valuations to chose from. A key result (Theorem 1) is a way to combine
different valuations such that the aggregated valuation asymptotically arrives at the true value.
Once a valuation has been obtained, it is important to come up with the best strategy from an auction
perspective. We use existing auction theory results along with extensions from a related paper (Kashyap
2018). We start with the benchmark scenario where the buyers, placing bids are assumed to have perfect and
complete information regarding their valuation of the portfolio that is being auctioned, that is private only
to them. We consider the uniform distribution as the simplest scenario and extend that to a more realistic
setting that considers the valuations to be log normally distributed. We further extend this by introducing
uncertainty into the estimation of bidder valuations and their bidding strategy. The possibility of the num-
ber of bidders being unknown, the valuations from various bidders being correlated or the interdependent
valuation framework and, a reserve price set by the auction seller are more complex extensions. Based on ex-
isting results, it is easily seen that the strategies of the bidders constitute a Nash equilibrium, under suitable
conditions.
Lastly, we run simulations to establish numerical examples for the set of valuations and for various bidding
strategies corresponding to the different auction settings. The next generation of models and empirical work
on securities lending activity would benefit by factoring in the methodologies considered here. Understanding
the inner workings of securities lending players, including the provision of better tools and models to aid their
efforts, could counter the recent concerns about risks in the securities lending space (End-note 6). In addition,
the models developed here could be potentially useful for inventory estimation and for wholesale procurement
of financial instruments and also non-financial commodities.
It is tempting to call this one of the more (most) challenging problems in finance, and even though this
is debatable and perhaps even labeled as due to ignorance on the author’s part, what stands true is that
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this is certainly one of the least explored yet profit laden areas of modern investment management. For
completeness, we provide a brief motivation for exclusive auctions before delving further into the mechanism
of estimating an auction bid for exclusives.
4 Motivation for Exclusive Auctions
We can trace the origins of Exclusive Auctions to the early 2000s. (Duffie, Garleanu & Pedersen 2002)
briefly mention an exclusive lending deal between Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) and California Public
Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) in 2000. We could found any other reference on this topic in a
serious academic paper. As with the rest of the securities lending industry, this practice is more prevalent
for equity portfolios. As opposed to traditional arrangements between intermediary brokers and beneficial
owners, where the loan rates on each security are negotiated periodically, an exclusive auction, as the name
suggests, provides sole usage of a portfolio of securities, or to a portion of the portfolio, to the winner
in an auction process for a certain time period. This arrangement is beneficial to both parties since the
intermediary broker gets single ownership to the portfolio. Intermediaries can use the portfolio as part of
their overall supply and even if the loan rates for a group of securities in the portfolio go up, the costs of
sourcing these special stocks remains the same. Intermediaries look at exclusives as a source of locking up
inventory for a certain time horizon. Beneficial owners get a guaranteed source of revenue and will not have
the administration hassle of having to constantly create new loans. They will not have to deal with multiple
intermediaries and can place their portfolio with an auction agent. Both parties do not need to negotiate or
renegotiate loan rates on individual securities for the duration of the exclusive contract.
The holdings in the portfolio on certain key dates are provided to the intermediary brokers or the agent
administering the auction to enable brokers to estimate the value of the portfolio from a lending perspective.
The intermediary brokers shade this valuation of the portfolio to suit the auction mechanism and make bids
accordingly. The bid is usually expressed as a certain number of basis points of the portfolio value at the time
of auction, applicable annually or over the duration of the exclusive agreement. In addition to the exclusive
bid, beneficial owners also sometimes charge transaction fees each time securities are taken out from the
portfolio or added back.
Beneficial owners continue to manage their portfolio positions as per their investment mandates or ac-
cording to their re-balancing guidelines or risk tolerances. This risk of turnover in the holdings is something
that intermediaries need to factor in their exclusive bids. The agreements can stipulate certain criteria on
the turnover of the holdings, which would require the exclusive fee to be reassessed. The huge size of the
portfolios that are generally auctioned and the relatively small price of the exclusive fees, in comparison with
the loan rates on individual securities, mean that winning an auction bid is an extremely profitable venture
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for intermediaries. In addition, by gaining access to an exclusive portfolio, intermediaries prevent competitors
from having access to this source of inventory, almost acting like monopolists in supplying loans for certain
hard to borrow instruments. This restricted supply enables loans to be priced higher. This phenomenon is
partly offset when a portfolio is auctioned to more than one bidder, but still provides pricing power to the
winners of the auction. This practice of spreading very large portfolios across three or four of the top bidders
is becoming more common.
Sometimes, the lending desk could have access to shares available to others parts of the firm when it acts
as a primer broker, operates derivative trading, proprietary trading or services private client accounts. This
additional inventory is readily available to the firm as a side effect of having other business units or trading
desks. The lending desks at various firms are expected to fully utilize this internal inventory before looking
outside for additional supply. Complete utilization of this internal inventory would reduce the funding costs
for the other business units and also make the loan rates charged by the firm cheaper than the loan rates of
other lending desks, when it has significant internal inventory. The variation in the valuation of the exclusive
across different firms would then primarily depend on the extent of the overlap of this internal supply with
the holdings in the exclusive. The other source of variation would be the loan rates the lending desk applies to
the loans it makes. Historically, the loans rates across different lending desks of different intermediaries have
varied considerably due to the opaque nature of the transactions and the variable demand seen by individual
desks. With centralized platforms, which consolidate and disclose rates across firms, coming into vogue loan
rates have converged to a considerable extent.
Another piece of the puzzle is the locate requests received by the lending desk on a daily basis. These locate
requests are sent by end borrowers, in advance of actually borrowing shares to short, to get an indication of
the quantity of shares they can borrow. This is done to ensure that their shorting needs for the trading day
can be met. The intermediary can fill either a portion or the entire locate request depending on its inventory
situation and also depending on how many firms are sending it locates for that particular security for that
trading day. But once a locate request is filled by a lending desk, they are expected to have that number
of shares ready for the borrowing firm. A borrowing firm, on the other hand, can borrow as much of the
filled locate amount as it chooses to. This mismatch between locate approvals and actual borrows then leads
to another aspect of the lending business that can be optimized by implementing different variations of the
Knapsack Algorithm (Martello & Toth 1987) and we consider this in another paper (Kashyap 2016). The
conversion factor from locates to borrows can be estimated as part of the locate approval optimization. For
the present purpose of estimating an exclusive value, we take this conversion factor as exogenously given.
Lending desks have been considering charging a nominal fee based on the locate amount they agree to fill
to discourage borrowers from sending in spurious locate requests, though this practice is yet to be formally
institutionalized across the lending industry.
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So in effect, the lending desk has a certain amount of borrows on the book at any time, which is matched
by a combination of internal inventory and supply from beneficial owners. Excess demand arrives in the form
of locate requests. Existing loan borrowers can increase their loan holdings via telephone or email, so the
loan book can change without the means of locate requests. Managing loan turnover, returning or acquiring
supply, locate fulfillment and negotiating the loan rates then constitute the primary loan management duties
of the desk.
4.1 Exclusive Auctions Wallet Size
A rough estimate of the potential profits that could be accrued by indulging in exclusives is shown in Figure
3. The point to keep in mind is that this is a highly conservative and approximate estimate since we have
used 1 Trillion USD as the notional amount of securities on loan and around 25 basis points as the loan fees
in our estimate (End-note 6 mentions that the volume weighted average loan rate in the US is around 38
basis points; many other markets have much higher weighted average loan rates). The global securities on
loan is around 2 trillion USD (Figure 4) and there are securities with loan rates of almost 25%. (Baklanova,
Copeland & McCaughrin 2015; End-notes 5, 6) have more details on the size of the securities lending market.
Even this simple back of the envelope calculation demonstrates that better techniques could go a long way in
boosting profits in the exclusive auction process, towards which to the best of our knowledge, no prior work
has been done that applies the use of quantitative methodologies.
Figure 3: Exclusive Auctions Profit Potential Estimate
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Figure 4: Securities Lending Market Size and Loan Fees
4.2 Buy Side and Sell Side Perspective
The sell side here would be the collection of intermediary firms that source supply and lend it on to final end
borrowers. The buy side here would have two segments of firms. One, the end borrowers who either have a
proprietary trading strategy or hedging that requires shorting certain securities. Two, the beneficial owners
who are long and provide supply to the intermediaries also fall under the buy side category. Depending on
which side a firm falls under, they will find the below derivations useful, since it will affect the rates they
charge or the rates they pay. This will also help auction designers, who operate on behalf of beneficial owners,
formulate an appropriate mechanism that results in the best outcomes for their clients. This can provide
transparency to the beneficial owners in terms of how the actual valuation of the portfolio might differ from
the actual bids received and hence the actual proceeds.
As we will see in the section 5, valuation of this portfolio requires understanding uncertainty from nu-
merous angles. As the participants try to find better and improved ways to contend with this uncertainty
(Kashyap 2017), we will see that the profitability of using this mechanism might decrease for participants
from both sides. This can lead to us believe that over time, as better valuation methods are used by the
participants, in an iterative fashion, the profits will continue to erode. A key duty of lending desks is the
management of collateral, which can lead to the movement of securities multiple times across many par-
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ties, exacerbating financial risk (End-note 8). Things can go drastically wrong even in simple environments
(Sweeney & Sweeney 1977), hence in a complex valuation of the sort that we are dealing here, extreme caution
should be the rule rather than the exception. (Kashyap 2017) looks at recent empirical examples related to
trading costs where unintended consequences set in. With the above background in mind, let us look at how
we could value an exclusive portfolio.
4.3 Related Literature
While the main results we develop for exclusive valuations are immediately applied to equity instruments,
the key distinction between consumption assets and investment assets [shorting generally applies only to
investments assets, whereas consumption assets cannot be directly shorted] should tell us that our valuation
methodologies can be used to transfer the rights on any bundle of investment assets. (Hull 2010) has a
description of consumption and investment assets, specific to the price determination of futures and forwards;
(Kashyap 2017, End-note 7) have a more general discussion.
The price effect on consumption assets affects the quantity bought and consumed, whereas with investment
assets (especially ones that can be shorted), the cyclical linkage between vacillating prices and increasing
numbers of transactions becomes more apparent. The primary focus on short selling is that activity in
the shorting market can be used to predict future security returns. There are many studies that develop
theoretical models and perform an application of these concepts to different data-sets, both public and
proprietary. By looking at the below studies on securities lending, it becomes clear that there is hardly any
paper that considers the motivations of the main players, the actions that arise due to these incentives and
the impact of these actions on the securities lending market and no study at all on how to determine the value
of exclusive auctions. The below studies can also be useful for understanding the importance of securities
lending towards better portfolio performance (even if a portfolio has no short sales) and why more research
towards uncovering the actions of the main players in the lending market can be helpful towards this goal.
(Duffie, Garleanu & Pedersen 2002) present a model of asset valuation in which short-selling is achieved
by searching for security lenders and by bargaining over the terms of the lending fee. They provide a closed-
form equilibrium solution, including the dynamics of the price, of the lending fees, and of the short interest.
The price is elevated by the prospect of future lending fees, and may, in the beginning, be even higher than
the valuation of the most optimistic agent. (Harrison & Kreps 1978; Morris 1996) obtain a similar result
but explained due to speculative behavior, or the right that investors hold to resell securities, which makes
them willing to pay more for it than they would pay if they were obliged to hold it forever. (Hong & Stein
2003) develop a theory of market crashes based on differences of opinion among investors, with a suggestion
that short-sales constraints may play a bigger role than one might have guessed based on just the direct
transactions costs associated with shorting.
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(Diamond & Verrecchia 1987) provide a theoretical model which implies that the costs associated with
short selling will squeeze liquidity traders out of such order flow. This has the effect of making short orders
more informative than the population of regular sell orders. (Allen, Morris & Postlewaite 1993) show that
even if there is a finite number of trading opportunities, the market price of a security can be above the
present value of its future dividends, that is a bubble can persist in the presence of asymmetric information
(or agents do not know the beliefs of other agents) with short-sales constraints. [For other theoretical work
on the implications of short sale constraints for stock prices, see (Jarrow 1980) and (Scheinkman & Xiong
2003)].
The standard empirical approach to testing the relation between the shorting market and future stock
returns relies on finding an appropriate measure of short sale constraints. This measure is usually obtained
either from data on direct costs of shorting from the stock loan market, or by employing proxies for shorting
demand or shorting supply. The idea behind looking at shorting demand is that some investors may want to
short a stock but may be impeded by constraints; if one can measure the size of this group of investors, one
can measure the extent of overpricing or the extent of private information left out of the market. The idea
behind looking at shorting supply is that since shorting a stock requires one first to borrow the shares, a low
supply of lend-able shares may indicate that short sale constraints are binding tightly.
(Aitken, Frino, McCorry & Swan 1998) build on prior research by extending the investigation of market
reaction to short sales to an intraday framework in a setting where short trades are transparent shortly after
the time of execution. Focusing on the Australian market, they find a significantly negative abnormal return
in calendar time following short sales (initiated using both market and limit ask orders). (Bris, Goetzmann
& Zhu 2007) analyze cross-sectional and time series information from forty-six equity markets around the
world, to consider whether short sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market, and the distributional
characteristics of returns to individual stocks and market indices. They find some evidence that in markets
where short selling is either prohibited or not practiced, market returns display significantly less negative
skewness. However, at the individual stock level, short sales restrictions appear to make no difference.
(Boehmer, Jones & Zhang 2008) use a panel of proprietary system order data from the New York Stock
Exchange to examine the incidence and information content of various kinds of short sale orders. Their find-
ings indicate that institutional short sellers have identified and acted on important value-relevant information
that has not yet been impounded into price. The results are strongly consistent with the emerging consen-
sus in financial economics that short sellers possess important information, and their trades are important
contributors to more efficient stock prices.
(Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan & Balachandran 2002) examine stocks on the NASDAQ and find that
heavily shorted firms experience significant negative abnormal returns after controlling for market, size, book-
to-market and momentum factors. The negative returns increase with the level of short interest, indicating
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that a higher level of short interest is a stronger bearish signals. (D’avolio 2002) describes the market for
borrowing and lending U.S. equities and provides an empirical summary of conditions that can generate and
sustain short sale constraints (defined as legal, institutional or cost impediments to selling securities short).
(Cohen, Diether and Malloy 2007) examine the link between the shorting market and stock prices using
proprietary data from an intermediary. They find that an increase in shorting demand leads to negative
abnormal returns. (Kolasinski, Reed & Ringgenberg 2013) empirically show that search frictions are related
to loan fee dispersion by examining the (Duffie, Garleanu & Pedersen 2002) model. [Other empirical studies
include: (Jones & Lamont 2002; Reed 2002; Geczy, Musto, and Reed 2007; Mitchell, Pulvino & Stafford
2002; Ofek & Richardson 2003; and Ofek, Richardson, & Whitelaw 2003); among others.]
5 Exclusive Valuation
5.1 Valuation Setup
The objective of a rational, risk neutral decision maker at the intermediary would be to maximize the profits,
P , by utilizing the shares available from the exclusive over the entire duration of the contract, extending
from time period, t = 0 to t = T (Eq. 1). We define all the variables as we introduce them in the text
but section 12 has a complete dictionary of all the notation and symbols used in the main results. υ, is the
valuation of the exclusive for the duration of the contract. A trivial result when the valuation is zero, υ = 0
will lead to the maximum amount of profits, but it should be clear that very low valuations will not lead
to securing the exclusive contract. Higher the valuation, higher the chances that the exclusive becomes less
elusive. Hence the goal is to obtain maximum bounds for the valuation, above which it will not be profitable
for the intermediary.
It is worth highlighting that the decision process of the intermediary (or the variables that he can directly
influence or set) will only include the amount of shares he can take from the exclusive, Ait, and the additional
supply of shares that can be sourced from other beneficial owners, Oit. Here, subscript i denotes the ith
security in the portfolio and the number securities ranges from i = 1 to i = n. The other variables are taken
as exogenous: Hit, the holdings available in the Exclusive pool; Rit, the rate on the stock loan charged by
the intermediary; Sit, the security price at a particular time; β is the discount factor. This assumption is the
most realistic scenario, but depending on the size of the exclusive and internal inventory, the loan rates can
further be taken as variables he can influence. What happens in practice is that there is usually a baseline
for the loan rates and a spread is added on top it. A deeper discussion of how loan rates are set including
the addition of a spread component are taken up in a separate paper (Kashyap 2016).
We get two constraints (Eq. 2, 3) based on the properties of the different variables. One is that the
amount of shares for a particular security taken from the exclusive is less than the total size of holdings in
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that security in the exclusive portfolio, Ait ≤ Hit. Clearly, 0 ≤ Ait is a trivial condition. The other one is
that the loan book carried by the desk, (existing amount loaned out to external borrowers and hence can
also be termed the borrow book; though certain intermediaries reserve the words “borrow book “to denote
the amount they have borrowed from external lenders; in our paper we these terms interchangeably), Bit,
plus any additional demand received based on the Locate requests Lit andδit ∈ [0, 1] , the conversion rate of
locates into borrows must equal (to be precise, it should be greater than) the sum of the Internal Inventory
the intermediary holds based on the positions of all trading desks within the firm, Iit, the total holdings in
the exclusive, Hit and the additional supply of shares, Oit. Usually securities lending desks have a certain
preferential treatment of different sources of inventory. Their primary source is the internal inventory, since
lending it out would reduce the funding rate for their firm positions. The next source will be any exclusive
arrangements, since a fee would need to be paid irrespective of whether these positions are used or not. The
last resort is to obtain shares from external lenders. Only when the supply from a more preferred source is
exhausted will a desk look to the next source on its list of suppliers.
P = max
Ait
E0
{
T∑
t=0
βt
(
n∑
i=1
AitSitRit
)
− υ
[
T∑
t=0
βt
(
n∑
i=1
HitSit
)]}
(1)
s.t.0 ≤ Ait ≤ Hit (2)
Iit +Hit +Oit ≤ Bit + δitLit (3)
We can model the security prices, loan rates, the loan book, internal inventory and exclusive holdings as
GBMs. For simplicity in the numerical results, we assume that the weiner process governing each of these
is independent. The loan book, the internal inventory and holdings represent number of shares, and hence
are always positive making them good candidates to be modeled as GBMs. Security prices are commonly
modeled as GBMs. In addition, our baseline models are diffusions without mean-reversion which we can
justify since an exclusive contract is usually agreed for one to two years and the variables will not take on
excessively large values in this duration (non-negative drift rates can grow a variable to infinity over time,
but some of our variables have negative drift rates as well as we see in the numerical results in section 7.1).
(Hull 2010) provides an excellent account of using GBMs to model stock prices and other time series that
are always positive; See (Norstad 1999) for a discussion of the log normal discussion.
The borrow process is highly volatile, with the the order of magnitude of the change in the total amount
of shares lent out over a few months being multiple times of the total amount carried at any point in time.
The internal inventory can change significantly as well, though there would be less turnover compared to
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the borrow process. This would of course depend on which parts of the firm the inventory is coming from.
The holdings of the exclusive are the least volatile of the three processes that govern shares (or at-least the
intermediary would hope so). The volatility of inventory turnover (or any supply) can be a sign of the quality
of the inventory and this can be used to come up with a rate accordingly (the rate here is the price of the
inventory). This extension and other improvements where the loan rates and the internal inventory can be
made endogenous as opposed to the present simplification where they are exogenous will be considered in a
subsequent paper (Kashyap 2016).
Geometric Brownian Motion ≡

dSit
Sit
= µSidt+ σSidW
Si
t
dRit
Rit
= µRidt+ σRidW
Ri
t
dBit
Bit
= µBidt+ σBidW
Bi
t
dIit
Iit
= µIidt+ σIidW
Ii
t
dHit
Hit
= µHidt+ σHidW
Hi
t
(4)
Geometric Brownian Motion⇐⇒ Log Normal Processes
WXit ⇐⇒Weiner Process governing Xthi variable.
E(dWXit dW
Xj
t ) = ρXi,Xjdt = 0
ρXi,Xj ⇐⇒ Correlation betweenWXit andWXjt
Xi ∈ {Si, Ri, Bi, Ii, Hi}
The locate process is more precisely modeled as a Poisson process since it would be reasonably accurate to
consider locates as discrete events occurring in time, that is, requests for a certain number of shares being
received in a given time interval. Given that most of the time, the number and size of the share requests
can be large, we would need to use a high value of the arrival rate, λi. Hence, we approximate this poison
process as the absolute value of a normal distribution with appropriate units (Cheng 1949). This introduces
a certain amount of skew, which is naturally inherent in this process.
Prob (Lit) =
e−λi (λi)
Lit
(Lit)!
(5)
Locate Process⇐⇒ Poission Process with Arrival Rate, λi (6)
Alternately, Lit ∼
∣∣N (µLi , σ2Li)∣∣ , Absolute Normal Distribution (7)
With the above variables and their properties, we consider ways in which we can simplify the sytem and
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obtain solutions that can aid in putting a numerical value on the portfolio of securities. In a complex system
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8), deriving equations can be daunting a exercise, and not to mention, of limited practical
validity. Hence, to supplements equations, we will employ simplifications that establish a few inequalities
governing this system. Pondering on the sources of uncertainty and the tools we have to capture it, might
lead us to believe that, either, the level of our mathematical knowledge is not advanced enough, or, we are
using the wrong methods. The dichotomy between logic and randomness is a topic for another time.
5.2 Benchmark Valuation or Zero Profits Upper Bounds
To obtain an upper bound for the profits, we note that if the cash flows received from the loans made using
the shares from the exclusive exactly balance out the payments to be made to the exclusive portfolio owner,
we would have zero profits. If this is the criteria under which we obtain zero profits, then it becomes the
maximum value one would be willing to pay for the exclusive contract; any actual valuation for the exclusive
should be less than this zero profit valuation: υactual = υ ≤ υzero. Here, we need to remember that we
only use exclusives when the total demand faced by the lending desk is higher than the internal inventory
available to the desk. This can be written as, when Bit + δiLit ≤ Iit then Ait = 0. Combining it with the
constraint (Eq. 2, Ait ≤ Hit), that is we cannot obtain shares greater than the total size of the holdings in
the exclusive, gives us a result captured in the below proposition.
Proposition 1. The zero profits upper bound for the valuation is given by
υactual = υ ≤ υzero = E0
{∑T
t=0
∑n
i=1 β
t min [Hit,max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)]SitRit∑T
t=0 β
t (
∑n
i=1HitSit)
}
(8)
Proof. See appendix 13.1.
An immediate takeaway from this expression, which has immense intuitive appeal, is that the higher the
valuation lesser will be the extent of overlap between the internal inventory and the exclusive holding. Check-
ing this historical overlap between internal inventory and exclusive holdings can be an excellent complement
to the valuation expressions we derive.
A standard theoretical approach to solving (Eq. 8) or obtaining a closed forum solution, is presently
unknown to the best of our knowledge, given the number of GBMs the system incorporates. An alternate
approach would be to estimate the parameters of all the random variables from historical data and run simu-
lations that would provide the required exclusive valuation. It is worth keeping in mind that the intermediary
firm or the beneficial owner will have access to a historical time series of some of the variables and hence
can estimate the actual process for the various variables. Though either party will not know the time series
of all the variables with certainty and hence would need to substitute the unknown variables purely with a
simulation based process, similar to what we have used in section 7.1. (Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay & Whitelaw
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1998; Lai & Xing 2008; Cochrane 2009) are handy resources on using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
and generalized method of moments (GMM) for parameter estimation. A simplification is to assume that
the variables are independent. While a realistic calculation might show that these variables are correlated,
such a simplification provides an excellent benchmark for our valuation exercise; (Gujarati 1995; Hamilton
1994) discuss time series simplifications and the need for parsimonious models . A backward induction based
computer program, which simulates the randomness component of the variables involved, can calculate the
value of the exclusive based on the above expression (Eq. 8).
As a further simplification in this upper limit (Eq. 8) for the valuation, we set β = 1. We then get the
υbeta valuation below, which is used as the foundation to derive other alternative expressions in section (5.3,
5.4 and 5.5),
υbeta = E0
{∑T
t=0
∑n
i=1 min [Hit,max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)]SitRit∑T
t=0 (
∑n
i=1HitSit)
}
(9)
5.3 Valuation with Transaction Costs
It is not uncommon to have a transaction cost, TC, when securities are taken out or put back into an exclusive
portfolio. Hence, it is useful to have a valuation expression, υtransaction, after incorporating transaction costs.
Proposition 2. The valuation expression that captures transaction costs is given by
υtransaction = E0

(∑T
t=0
∑n
i=1 min [Hit,max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)]SitRit
)
− (TC)(∑T
t=0
∑n
i=1HitSit
)
 (10)
Here,
Transaction Costs ≡ TC = E0
{
n∑
i=1
c
{
max (Bi0 + δiLi0 − Ii0, 0)
(Bi0 + δiLi0 − Ii0)
}
+
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
c
2
[∣∣∣∣{max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)(Bit + δiLit − Iit)
− max (Bit−1 + δiLit−1 − Iit−1, 0)
(Bit−1 + δiLit−1 − Iit−1)
}
−
{
max (Iit −Bit − δiLit, 0)
(Iit −Bit − δiLit)
− max (Iit−1 −Bit−1 − δiLit−1, 0)
(Iit−1 −Bit−1 − δiLit−1)
}∣∣∣∣]}
Proof. See appendix 13.2.
It is trivial to see that,
υtransaction ≤ υ = υactual ≤ υzero (11)
In a similar vein, we can also arrive at an expression for transaction costs when the charges to Take and Give
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are different. We don’t derive that here, since that is usually a rarity. Alternately, (Erdos and Hunt 1953)
derive results regarding the change of signs of sums of random variables which can provide approximations
for transaction costs.
5.4 Other Conservative Valuation Inequalities to Supplement Equations
We now provide various methods to come up with more conservative estimates of the valuation. We call these
conservative valuations because they underestimate the potential benefit or profits such a valuation would
bring. As we can see from (Eq. 9), there are two variables that can be useful towards this end. First, we can
set δi = 0 or when excess demand is zero (other alternatives are lower values of δi), giving us a conservative
valuation, υconservative,with zero excess demand,
⇒ υconservative = E0
{∑T
t=0
∑n
i=1 min [Hit,max (Bit − Iit, 0)]SitRit∑T
t=0 (
∑n
i=1HitSit)
}
(12)
Instead of using the rates at which the desk makes loans to borrowers, we can use the rate at which it finds
supply from other beneficial owners. Sometimes, where no other supply is available a theoretical rate is used
by lending desks. The different possible variations here would depend on the different types of rates (possibly
due to different levels of spread) a lending desk would use on a daily basis and also store historically. We
show two variations one which has a lower value of the loan rates, υbeta alternate, and another combines zero
excess demand with the lower value of the loan rates , υalternate,
⇒ υbeta alternate = E0
{∑T
t=0
∑n
i=1 min [Hit,max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)]SitQit∑T
t=0 (
∑n
i=1HitSit)
}
(13)
⇒ υalternate = E0
{∑T
t=0
∑n
i=1 min [Hit,max (Bit − Iit, 0)]SitQit∑T
t=0 (
∑n
i=1HitSit)
}
(14)
This gives the following pecking order of valuations for the exclusive.
υbeta ≥ υconservative ≥ υalternate (15)
υbeta ≥ υbeta alternate ≥ υalternate (16)
The intermediary can decide on their level of aggressiveness and choose which of the valuations they wants to
use, depending on how many exclusives they already have, the extent of overlap with their internal inventory,
the number of special names in the exclusive portfolio and the volatility of the time series of daily profits from
the exclusive. Such a tiered approach is found to be more practical rather than having an exact valuation
since there are too many sources of uncertainty and the noise or the variance of any exact valuation number
20
would tend to be high.
5.5 Historical Valuations
Given the complexity and the number of variables to be estimated (Eqs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8), a simple heuristic
would be utilize the historical time series of each of the variables and then use that as a possible guide to the
calculation of the exclusive value. The theoretical justification for using the actual historical series directly to
value the exclusive without first resorting to parameter estimations and then running simulations using the
estimated distribution parameters is that there are errors introduced during the estimation which are then
compounded while doing the simulations (Kashyap 2017). The pecking order shown above (Eqs: 11, 15 and
16) can be arrived at using the historical time series as well. Using this, we can also arrive at the time series
of the daily profits that would accrue to the intermediary. The volatility of the daily value of the exclusive
can be suggestive in terms of how aggressive one should be in picking one of the valuation tiers. Any of the
historical valuations υhistorical can be represented as below, where −Ts and −Te denote the start and end of
the time series such that Ts ≥ Te,
⇒ υhistorical =
{∑−Te
t=−Ts
∑n
i=1 min [Hit,max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)]SitRit∑−Te
t=−Ts (
∑n
i=1HitSit)
}
(17)
New valuation time series can be created by adding transaction costs or alternate rates, or other combinations.
Armed with this set of valuations,
{
υzero, υbeta, υbeta alternate, υtransaction, υconservative, υalternate, υhistorical
}
,
the bidder can combine them using the method we shown in the next sub-section (5.6).
5.6 Variance Weighted Combined Valuation
We now show a way to combine the valuations using the variance of individual valuation time series and argue
that under certain conditions of finite variance and finite valuation of each individual time series, we get closer
to the true valuation as the number of individual time series considered in the aggregation gets larger. For
simplicity of notation, in this section we let each individual time series be represented by υi, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}
with corresponding variances σ2i and the true valuation by υ with corresponding variance σ2.
Theorem 1. If each of the variances and the valuations are finite,
{
σ2i <∞; υi <∞
}
, no single one domi-
nates the sum, expressed as,
 limk→∞max
(
σ2i
)
k∑
i=1
σ2i
→ 0 ; lim
k→∞
max
(
σ2i υi
)
k∑
i=1
σ2i υi
→ 0

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and the valuations are uniformly bounded, that is for any real number M ,
k∑
i=1
σ2i vi ≤ (
k∑
i=1
σ2i ) ≤M
When each of the individual valuations are weighted using the scheme shown below (sum of the variance of
all other valuations divided by the total variance) the expression below asymptotically converges to the true
valuation.
E
 limk→∞ 1(k)
k∑
i=1
k∑
j 6=i
σ2jυi
k∑
i=1
σ2i
 = E [υ]
Proof. See appendix 13.3, which also provides an expression for the variance of the aggregated valuations.
This has an intuitive and practical appeal since the time series with a higher variance is set a lower weight
in the combined valuation. This means the more expressions we are able to derive for the valuations and
combine them, the better will be our estimation. Of course, it becomes important to ensure that we do not
have redundant valuation expressions that are just multiples of one other; but valuations that would be good
candidates to vary and create newer time series are the ones that differ by capturing the different possible
variations in any of the variables that can affect the valuation outcome. This result has a certain theoretical
significance since it shows that when any object has multiple valuations, where each valuation might arise
due to slightly different assumptions; a combination using our technique gets closer to the true valuation.
Alternately, the intermediary can subjectively select a particular valuation to suit the institutional setup
or relevance depending on the preferences at the intermediary (whether their internal inventory tends to be
large or they are looking to have many exclusives in place expecting greater future demand and so on). Either
way, once a final valuation has been obtained the next step is to prepare for an auction process and pick a
strategy that will shade the value to suit the mechanics of different auction situations.
6 Auction Strategy
Once we have the valuation from the previous section (5), it is important to look at different auction formats
and the specifics of how an intermediary would tailor bids to adapt to the particular auction setting. From
the perspective of the owner of the exclusive portfolio, he would use the valuation and the auction setting
to understand the potential revenue opportunity. We consider a few variations in the first price sealed bid
auction mechanism. The key auction theory results we use, including the proofs for some of the extensions of
core auction theory results to real life applications, are from (Kashyap 2018). The results we discuss below
are also important for the numerical calculations in section 7.2.
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The literature on Auction Theory is vast and deep. The following standard and detailed texts on this
topic might aid the interested reader: (Klemperer 2004; Krishna 2009; Menezes & Monteiro 2005; and
Milgrom 2004). Additional references are (Laffont, Ossard & Vuong 1995; Milgrom & Weber 1982); for using
numerical techniques (Miranda & Fackler 2002) or approximations to the error function (Chiani, Dardari and
Simon 2003) . (Ortega-Reichert 1967; and Harstad, Kagel & Levin 1990) derive the expression when there
is uncertainty about the number of bidders. (Levin & Ozdenoren 2004; and Dyer, Kagel & Levin 1989) are
other useful references. (Lebrun 1999) derives conditions for the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium with
more than two bidders.
A bidding strategy is sensitive to assumed distributions of both the valuations and the number of bidders.
This is seen from the expression for the bid strategy in (Lemma 1). As a benchmark bidding case, it is
illustrative to assume that all bidders know their valuations and only theirs and they believe that the values
of the others are independently distributed according to the general distribution F . xi is the valuation of
bidder i. This is a realization of the random variable Xi which bidder i and only bidder i knows for sure.
xi ∼ F [0, ω], xi is symmetric and independently distributed according to the distribution F over the interval
[0, ω]. F, is increasing and has full support, which is the non-negative real line [0,∞], hence in this formulation
we can have ω = ∞. f = F ′, is the continuous density function of F . M, is the total number of bidders.
When there is no confusion about which specific bidder we are referring to, we drop the subscripts such as
in the valuation x. Y1 ≡ YM−11 , is the random variable that denotes the highest value, say for bidder 1,
among the M − 1 other bidders. Y1, is the highest order statistic of X2, X3, ..., XM . G, is the distribution
function of Y1. That is, ∀y, G(y) = [F (y)]M−1and g = G′, is the continuous density function of G or Y1.
m (x) , is the expected payment of a bidder with value x. βi : [0, ω]→ <+ is an increasing function that gives
the strategy for bidder i. We let βi (xi) = bi. We must have βi (0) = 0. β : [0, ω] → <+ is the strategy of
all the bidders in a symmetric equilibrium. We let β (x) = b, x is the valuation of any bidder. We also have
b ≤ β (x) and β (0) = 0.
Lemma 1. The symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy for a bidder, the expected payment of a bidder and
the expected revenue of a seller are given by
Equilibrium Bid Function is,
β (x) =
[
x−
∫ x
0
[
F (y)
F (x)
]M−1
dy
]
Expected ex ante payment of a particular bidder is,
E [m (x)] =
∫ ω
0
y [1− F (y)] g (y) dy
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Expected revenue, Rs, to the seller is
E [Rs] = ME [m (x)]
We consider two distributions for shading the valuation to formulate a bidding strategy: Uniform and
Log-normal. The two distribution types we discuss can shed light on the other types of distributions in which
only positive observations are allowed. The uniform distribution is well uniform and hence is ideal when
the valuations (or sometimes even the number of bidders) are expected to fall equally on a finite number of
possibilities (Corollary 1). This serves as one extreme to the sort of distribution we can expect in real life.
Corollary 1. The symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy when the valuations are distributed uniformly is
given by
β (x) =
(
M − 1
M
)
x
Here, xi ∼ U [0, ω] since we are considering the uniform distribution.
The other case is a log-normal distribution which centers around a value and the chance of observing values
further away from this central value become smaller. Asset prices are generally modeled as log-normal, so
financial applications, including an exclusive valuation would benefit from this extension. The absence of a
closed form solution for the log-normal distribution forces us to develop a rough theoretical approximation
(Corollary 2) and improve upon that significantly using non-linear regressions (Remark 1; Eq. 18). This
works well for our particular application, since the valuations are generally small, of the order of a few basis
points. A detailed discussion of the the log-normal approximation, including the accuracy of the regression
results, suggested values for the regression coefficients and the sensitivity of the bid strategy to the valuation,
the parameters of the valuation distribution and the number of bidders is provided in (Kashyap 2018).
Corollary 2. The symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy when the valuations are small, of the order less
than one, and distributed log-normally, can be roughly approximated as
β (x) =
x−
∫ x
0
[
Φ
(
ln y−µ
σ
)]M−1
dy[
Φ
(
ln x−µ
σ
)]M−1

≈ x
2
Here, Φ(u) = 1√
2pi
∫ u
−∞ e
−t2/2dt , is the standard normal cumulative distribution and X = eWwhere, W ∼
N (µ, σ). xi ∼ LN [0, ω] since we are considering the log-normal distribution.
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Remark 1. A better approximation for the log-normal distribution can be obtained using non-linear regression
to find the constant, C, and the power coefficients, a1,a2,a3 and a4 in the expression below,
β (x) = Cxa1µa2σa3Ma4 (18)
Comparing the bidding strategy in the two cases, uniform and log-normal distribution of valuations, we
see that when the number of bidders are large, both do not depend significantly on the number of bidders
and the bid is larger with a uniform distribution.
In many auction settings, the auction seller can set a minimum bid to ensure that he is guaranteed a
minimum amount of revenue. This minimum bid is known as the reserve price. Our valuation techniques
can help auction sellers come up with a reserve price. Clearly, if the reserve price is too high, many potential
bidders will shy away from participating in the auction. But setting a reserve price, ensures that the bid
strategies need to be higher to ensure successfully winning the auction (Lemma 2).
Lemma 2. The symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy when the valuation is greater than the reserve price,
(r > 0), of the seller, x ≥ r, is
For a general distribution,
β (x) = r
G (r)
G (x)
+
1
G (x)
∫ x
r
yg (y) dy
Alternately β (x) = x−
∫ x
r
G (y)
G (x)
dy
When the valuations are distributed uniformly, the bid strategy with a reserve price is given in (Corollary
3),
Corollary 3. The symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy when the valuation is greater than the reserve price
of the seller, x ≥ r, and valuations are from an uniform distribution,
β (x) =
rM
xM−1
(
M + 1
M
)
+ x
(
M − 1
M
)
When the valuations are distributed log-normally, the bid strategy with a reserve price is given in (Corol-
lary 4),
Corollary 4. The symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy when the valuation is greater than the reserve price
of the seller, x ≥ r, and valuations are from a log normal distribution,
β (x) = x
[
h′ (r) (x− r)
h (x)
+
r
x
h (r)
h (x)
]
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Here, h′ (r) = (M − 1)
[∫ ( lnr−µσ )
−∞
e−t
2/2dt
]M−2{
e−(
lnr−µ
σ )
2
/2
rσ
}
The following result can aid auction sellers in finding an optimal reserve price (Lemma 3),
Lemma 3. The optimal reserve price for the seller, r∗ must satisfy the following expression,
xs = r
∗ − [1− F (r
∗)]
f (r∗)
Here, seller has a valuation, xs ∈ [0, ω)
When there is uncertainty about how many interested bidders there are, we denote the potential set
of bidders as M = {1, 2, . . . ,M}. A ⊆ M is the set of actual bidders. All potential bidders draw their
valuations independently distributed according to the general distribution F . Also, pl is the probability that
any participating bidder, i ∈ A, is facing l other bidders or the probability that he assigns to the event
that he is facing l other bidders. This implies that there is a total of l + 1 bidders, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M − 1}.
Gl (x) = [F (x)]
l is the probability of the event that the highest of l values drawn from the symmetric
distribution F is less than x, his valuation and the bidder wins in this case. βl (x) is the equilibrium bidding
strategy when there are a total of exactly l + 1 bidders, known with certainty. The overall probability that
the bidder will win when he bids βM (x) is
G (x) =
M−1∑
l=0
plG
l (x) (19)
Hence the equilibrium bid for an actual bidder when he is unsure about the number of rivals he faces is a
weighted average of the equilibrium bids in an auction when the number of bidders is known to all. (McAfee
& McMillan 1987b) is one of the most well known and early generalizations to allow the number of bidders
to be stochastic.
Lemma 4. The equilibrium strategy when there is uncertainty about the number of bidders is given by
βM (x) =
M−1∑
l=0
plG
l (x)
G (x)
βl (x)
When bidding for an exclusive, an intermediary, will expect most of the other major players to be bidding
as well. Invariably, there will be some drop outs, depending on their recent exclusive bidding activity and
some smaller players will show up based on the composition of the portfolio being auctioned. It is a reasonable
assumption that all of the bidders hold similar beliefs about the distribution of the number of players. Hence,
for the numerical results, we construct a symmetric discrete distributions of the sort shown in (Figure 5).
This formulations of a positive symmetric discrete distribution is likely to be followed by the total number of
26
auction participants, and we incorporate this into auction theory results. We show that such a distribution
satisfies all the properties of a probability distribution function as part of the proof for Lemma 5 (Kashyap
2018). It is to be noted that this symmetric discrete distribution comes under the family of triangular
distributions (End-note 9). We can easily come up with variations that can provide discrete asymmetric
probabilities. For simplicity, we use the uniform distribution for the valuations and set ω = 1. The below
result follows from a bidding strategy that incorporates the use of the discrete symmetric distribution.
Lemma 5. The bidding strategy and the formula for the probability of facing any particular total number of
bidders under a symmetric discrete distribution would be given by,
β (x) =
M−1∑
l=0
(
plx
l∑M−1
k=0 pkx
k
)(
l
l + 1
)
x
pl =

l∆p , if l ≤ (M−1)2
(M − l) ∆p , if l > (M−1)2
∆p =
{⌊
M2
4
⌋}−1
We note that ∆p can also be written as,
∆p =
1{⌊
(M−1)
2
⌋{⌊
(M−1)
2
⌋
+ 1
}
+
[{(
(M−1)
2 mod 1
)
+ (M−1)2
}{
2
(
(M−1)
2 mod 1
)}]}
⌊
(M − 1)
2
⌋
is the integer floor function, that is, it rounds any number down to the nearest integer.
A mod B is the modulo operator, that is, it gives the remainer when A is divided by B.
When A is a fraction less than one and B is one, the result is the fraction itself.
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Figure 5: Variable Bidders Symmetric Discrete Probability Distributions
This discrete distribution can also be a possibility for the valuations themselves, since the set of prices of
assets or valuations can be from a finite set. But given the distribution, developing a bidding strategy based
on this discussion is trivial and hence is not explicitly considered here. Lastly, the case of interdependent
valuations are to be highly expected in real life; but practical extensions for this case are near absent both
in the literature and in practice. In appendix 15, we provide extensions when the valuations of the bidders
are interdependent and incorporate the corresponding results into a final combined realistic setting. We
also provide additional results when bidders hold asymmetric beliefs in appendix 15. These results can be
useful extensions to aid the profit maximization goals of exclusive auction participants depending on the
assumptions they wish to make regarding their environment and can be useful for bidders and auctions
sellers during the wholesale procurement of other financial instruments.
7 Numerical Results
7.1 Data-set Construction
As noted earlier in section 5.1, given the number of random variables involved and the complexity of the
system, the computational infrastructure required to value an exclusive can be tremendous. A typical ex-
clusive portfolio can have anywhere from a few hundred to upwards of a thousand different securities. It is
therefore simpler to use the historical time series and calculate the valuation from the corresponding formula
derived in section 5.5. To demonstrate numerical results we simulate the historical time series. We pick a
sample portfolio with one hundred different hypothetical securities and we come up with the time series of
all the variables involved (Price, Quantity Borrowed, Exclusive Holding, Inventory Level, Loan Rate, Alter-
nate Loan Rate) by sampling from suitable log normal distributions. It is worth noting that the mean and
standard deviation of each time series are themselves simulations from other appropriately chosen uniform
distributions (Figure 6). The locate process can be modeled as a Poisson distribution with appropriately
chosen units. Though we consider the simpler alternative by letting it be the absolute value of a normal
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distribution as justified in section 5.1. The mean and standard deviation of the locate distribution for each
security are chosen from another appropriately chosen uniform distribution.
The simulation seed is chosen so that the drift and volatility we get for the variables (mean and standard
deviation for the locate process) are similar to what would be observed in practice. For example in Figure
6, the price and rate volatility are lower than the volatilities of the borrow and other quantities, which tend
to be much higher; the range of the drift for the quantities is also higher as compared to the drift range of
prices and rates. This ensures that we are keeping it as close to a realistic setting as possible, without having
access to the historical time series. The volatility and drift of the variables for each security are shown in
Figure 7. The length of the simulated time series is one year or 252 trading days for each security. A sample
of the time series of the variables generated using the simulated drift and volatility parameters is shown in
Figure 8. The full time series used for the calculations is available upon request.
Figure 6: Simulation Seed
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Figure 7: Simulation Sample Distributions
Figure 8: Simulation Sample Time Series
7.2 Model Testing Results
To summarize the results of the testing we show the summary statistics and the matrix of portfolio valuations
under different valuation criteria and auction settings in (Figure 9). The columns from one to six denote
the following valuations
{
υzero, υbeta, υbeta alternate, υtransaction, υalternate, υconservative
}
respectively. The
first and second rows are the mean and standard deviation of the daily valuations. The third row indicates
the valuation over the entire time period under consideration. The fourth, fifth and sixth row indicate the
valuations when the valuations of the other bidders are distributed uniformly and there are 5,10 or 15 other
bidders respectively. The seventh row indicates the log-normal assumption for the valuations of the other
bidders. The eight, ninth and tenth rows are when there are reserve prices set by the auction seller of 15, 20
and 25 basis points respectively with ten other bidders. The eleventh row indicates the case when we have
uncertainty about the number of bidders and a total of ten bidders are distributed according to the discrete
symmetric distribution in (Figure 5).
We see that the valuation ranges from 30 to 50 basis points under different valuation schemes. The
exclusive holding value varies between 1 billion to 2 billion over the time period under consideration. We
have not considered currency rates for simplicity, but a real portfolio could hold securities traded in different
currencies introducing foreign exchange rate uncertainty into the mix. When we repeat the simulations with
different seed values, the results could vary outside this range, but are not drastically different. The combined
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valuation based on the result in theorem 1 is around 34 basis points. This shows that the valuation with the
lowest variance, which is 30 basis points (Valuation_Alternate: third row, fifth column in Figure 9) has a
greater influence on the combined valuation due to its higher weight in the aggregation. This makes practical
sense since a valuation with lesser variance will provide more stable revenue streams. We have not provided
the auction bidding strategies based on this combined valuation, but these can be easily calculated if someone
wishes to proceed down that route.
We easily verify some results well known in the auction literature (Krishna 2009): 1) As the number of
bidders bidding uniformly increases, the bid increases; 2) Setting a reserve price results in higher bids. The
bid with a discrete symmetric distribution as the number of bidders goes higher is comparable to the crude
theoretical approximation for the log normal distribution, which does not depend on the number of bidders
(Corollary 2). The Comparative Statics of the valuation with changes in Beta are shown in Figures 10. As
the subjective discount factor β decreases, the valuation increases since the effect of the discounting is higher
on the holding levels than on the revenue. A time series graph of the different valuations are shown in Figure
11.
Figure 9: Valuation Summary Statistics
Figure 10: Valuation Beta Comparative Statics
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Figure 11: Valuation Time Series
8 Improvements to the Model
Numerous improvements to the model are possible. (Cobb, Rumi & Salmerón 2012; and Nie & Chen 2007)
derive approximate distributions for the sum of log normal distribution which highlight that we can estimate
the log normal parameters from the time series of the valuations and hence get the mean and variance of the
valuations. A longer historical time series will help to get better estimates for the volatility of the valuation.
This can be useful to decide the aggressiveness of the bid. Another key extension can be to introduce jumps
in the stochastic processes. This is seen in stock prices to a certain extent and to a greater extent in the
borrow, holding and inventory processes.
The auction theory aspects combine standard results with new extensions (Kashyap 2018) for the log-
normal case, the interdependent case and a combined realistic setting with uniform distributions. Instead
of the bidding strategies we have considered, we can come up with a parametric model that will take the
valuations as the inputs and the bid as output. The parameters can depend on the size of the portfolio, the
number of securities, the number of special securities, the number of markets, the extent of overlap with the
internal inventory, and where available, the percentile rankings of the historical bids for previous auctions,
which auction sellers do reveal sometimes.
A key open question is to decide which of the valuations to use for the bidding strategy if we do not opt
to combine them based on our variance weighting (section 5.6). This aspect will require views on how the
loan rates might evolve and which securities in the exclusive pool will stay special or might become special,
and hence can be used to pick either a more aggressive or a less aggressive valuation. In a subsequent paper
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(Kashyap 2016), we will look at how we can systematically try and establish expectations on loan rates and
which securities might become harder to borrow and hence have higher profit margins on the loans. The
locate conversion ratio can also be the result of profit maximization when the Knapsack algorithm (Martello
& Toth 1987) is used to allocate the locates.
9 Conclusion
We have looked at a methodology to value securities portfolios from a securities lending perspective. We have
then looked at various bidding strategies that would be relevant to an exclusive auction. We derived the closed
form solutions where such a formulation exists and in situations where approximations and numerical solutions
would be required we have provided those. The paper presents a theoretical foundation supplemented with
empirical results for a largely unexplored financial business. The results from the simulation confirm the
complexity inherent in the system, but point out that the heuristics we have used can be a practical tool
for bidders and auction sellers to maximize their profits. The models developed here could be potentially
useful for inventory estimation and for wholesale procurement of financial instruments and also non-financial
commodities.
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3. “An Introduction to Securities Lending” by Mark C Faulkner, which may be downloaded at www.spitalfieldsadvisors.com,
was commissioned by the UK Securities Lending and Repo Committee, the International Securities
Lending Association, the London Stock Exchange, the London Investment Banking Association, the
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British Bankers’ Association and the UK Association of Corporate Treasurers and was welcomed by the
National Association of Pension Funds and the Association of British Insurers. It was first published
in 2004.(Securities Lending One)
4. “An Introduction to Securities Lending (Australia)” is the Australian adaptation of the UK publication
focused on the UK markets, entitled “An Introduction to Securities Lending” by Mark C Faulkner in
(End-note 3). This adaptation was commissioned by the Australian Securities Lending Association
Limited (ASLA). (Securities Lending Two)
5. The value of available inventory as of June 22, 2015, stands at $13.22 trillion, according to a new info-
graphic on the global securities finance market from DataLend. Of the available inventory worldwide,
$1.72 trillion was out on loan. The value of equity on loan was $851 billion, while fixed income on
loan stood at $876 billion. Some 41,673 unique securities were out loan, according to the info-graphic,
yielding an estimated gross revenue of $19.2 million per day on average, which equates to $2.26 billion
for the first half of 2015. The US is still the largest market with $954 billion out on loan as of 22 June.
Canada is the closest market in size, with an estimated $131 billion of securities out on loan. Despite
its size, the US commands a fee of 38 basis points (volume-weighted average, year to date), whereas
Hong Kong, which has $28.8 billion out on loan, yields fees of 210 basis points. (Securites Lending
Three)
6. As the potential risks of securities lending are discussed and debated by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC), the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Financial Research (OFR), and the Financial Stability
Board (FSB), it is important to try to understand both the overall size of the securities lending market
and the share of it attributable to different participants. Based on one estimate from the FSOC the
percentage is typically around these values (Retirement and Pension, Mutual Funds, Endowments,
Insurance: 50%, 35%, 8%, 6%). (Securites Lending Four).
7. Despite the several advances in the social sciences and in particular economic and financial theory,
we have yet to discover an objective measuring stick of value, a so called, True Value Theory. While
some would compare the search for such a theory, to the medieval alchemist’s obsession with turning
everything into gold, for our present purposes, the lack of such an objective measure means that the
difference in value as assessed by different participants can effect a transfer of wealth. This forms the
core principle that governs all commerce that is not for immediate consumption in general, and also
applies specifically to all investment related traffic which forms a great portion of the financial services
industry. Although, some of this is true for consumption assets; because the consumption ability of
individuals and organizations is limited and their investment ability is not, the lack of an objective
measure of value affects investment assets in a greater way and hence investment assets and related
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transactions form a much greater proportion of the financial services industry. Consumption assets do
not get bought and sold, to an inordinate extent, due to fluctuating prices, whereas investment assets
will.
8. The cyclical nature of the transactions, which in some case can have its tentacles spread far and wide,
can result in catastrophic repercussions, especially when huge sums of money move back and forth
(Harrington 2009 is a discussion of the financial crisis, systemic risk and the management of collateral
considering the role of American International Group, AIG, as a case study; AIG ran into major
problems with the securities lending program of its life insurance subsidiaries when borrowers requested
the return of large amounts of collateral). No discussion involving randomness is complete (Taleb 2005;
2010), especially one involving randomness to the extent that we are tackling here, without being
highly attuned to spurious results mistakenly being treated as correct and extreme situations causing
devastating changes to the expected outcomes.
9. Triangular distribution, Wikipedia Link: In probability theory and statistics, the triangular distribution
is a continuous probability distribution with lower limit a, upper limit b and mode c, where a < b and
a ≤ c ≤ b (also see: Evans, Hastings & Peacock 2000).
10. Irwin–Hall distribution, Wikipedia Link: In probability and statistics, the Irwin–Hall distribution,
named after Joseph Oscar Irwin and Philip Hall, is a probability distribution for a random variable
defined as the sum of a number of independent random variables, each having a uniform distribution.
For this reason it is also known as the uniform sum distribution (also see: Hall 1927; Irwin 1927).
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12 Appendix: Dictionary of Notation and Terminology for the Ex-
clusive Valuation
• Bit, the Loan Book carried by the desk, in shares, at a particular time, t, for security, i. This is the
existing amount borrowed by external lenders and hence can also be termed the borrow book.
• Lit, the Locate Requests received, in shares, at a particular time, t, for security, i.
• δit ∈ [0, 1] , the conversion rate of locates into borrows, at a particular time, t, for security, i. We can
simplify this to be the same per security.
• δi, the conversion rate of locates into borrows for security, i. We can simplify this further to be a
constant across time and securities, δ.
• δiLit, then indicates the excess demand that the desk receives, in shares, at a particular time, t, for
security, i.
• Iit, the Internal Inventory the intermediary holds, in shares, at a particular time, t, for security, i.
• Oit, the additional supply that can be sourced from beneficial owners other than the exclusive, in shares,
at a particular time, t, for security, i.
• Ait, the Amount taken out from the Exclusive pool, in shares, at a particular time, t, for security, i.
• Hit, the Holdings available in the Exclusive pool, in shares, at a particular time, t, for security, i.
• Rit, the Rate on the loan charged by the intermediary, at a particular time, t, until the next time
period, t+ 1, for security, i.
• Qit, an alternate rate to Rit, at a particular time, t, until the next time period, t + 1, for security, i.
This could be the rate at which supply from other beneficial owners is sourced or could be theoretical
rate when no rate from other beneficial owners is available. Qit ≤ Rit.
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• Sit, the Security Price at a particular time, t, until the next time period, t+ 1, for security, i.
• β = 1(1+s) , is the discount factor, s is the risk free rate of interest. Further complications can be
introduced by incorporating continuous time extensions to the short rate process.
• υ, the Valuation of the exclusive, for the duration extending from t = 0 to t = T.
• The total duration for which the exclusive will be contracted, T .
• P , the profits from the exclusive for the intermediary over the entire duration T .
• Ts and Te are the start and end times of the historical time series.
• n, the number of securities available in the Exclusive pool, i ∈ {1, ... , n}.
• c, the transaction cost each time shares are taken or put back into the exclusive.
• N, the number of trading intervals.
• The length of each trading interval, τ = T/N . We assume the time intervals are of the same duration,
but this can be relaxed quite easily.
In continuous time, this becomes, N →∞, τ → 0.
• The time then becomes divided into discrete intervals, tk = kτ, k = 0, ..., N . We simplify this and
write it as t = 0 to t = T with unit increments.
• It is common practice to consider daily increments in time for one year. The fees paid generally also
applies on weekends and holidays, though there would be no change in any of the variables on these
days. Some firms use 252 trading days to annualize daily loan rates and other fee terms.
• {υzero, υbeta, υbeta alternate, υtransaction, υconservative, υalternate, υhistorical}, is the set of valuations.
13 Appendix: Valuation Proofs
13.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. First, we simplify the constraints by reasoning as follows. If there is other external supply, Oit , being
used, then we have
Iit +Hit ≤ Bit + δiLit
⇒ Iit +Ait ≤ Bit + δiLit
⇒ Ait ≤ Bit + δiLit − Iit
⇒ if Bit + δiLit ≤ Iit then Ait = 0
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The maximum possible value of Ait is then given by
Ait = min [Hit,max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)]
The criteria for zero profits, gives us an expression for the maximum possible value of the exclusive.
P = max
Ait
E0
{
T∑
t=0
βt
n∑
i=1
AitSitRit −
T∑
t=0
υβt
(
n∑
i=1
HitSit
)}
= E0
{
T∑
t=0
n∑
i=1
βt min [Hit,max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)]SitRit −
T∑
t=0
υβt
(
n∑
i=1
HitSit
)}
⇒ υactual = υ ≤ υzero = E0
{∑T
t=0
∑n
i=1 β
t min [Hit,max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)]SitRit∑T
t=0 β
t (
∑n
i=1HitSit)
}
13.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let the following variables, {Taket, Givet} represented by the corresponding functions below, denote
the criteria that captures when there would be a need to take from (when the total demand including existing
borrows and a portion of the locate requests is more than the internal inventory) or give back to the exclusive.
High State ≡ Taket ≡ max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)
(Bit + δiLit − Iit) =

1 if Bit + δiLit > Iit
0 Otherwise
Low State ≡ Givet ≡ max (Iit −Bit − δiLit, 0)
(Iit −Bit − δiLit) =

1 if Bit + δiLit < Iit
0 Otherwise
It is worth noting that Taket and Givet are mutually exclusive. Only one of them can be one in a given
time period. We consider the following four scenarios that can happen, back to back, or in successive time
periods.
[{Taket−1, Taket} {Taket−1, Givet} {Givet−1, Givet} {Givet−1, Taket}]
Of the above scenarios, the following indicates the transaction cost incurred correspondingly. There is a cost,
when a state change occurs either from Take to Give or from Give to Take.
[{0} {c} {0} {c}]
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The above is equivalent to
[{Taket, Taket−1} {Taket, Givet−1} {Givet, Givet−1} {Givet, Taket−1}] ≡ [{0} {c} {0} {c}]
The table below (Figure 12) summarizes the transaction costs incurred, based on the difference between vari-
ables across successive time periods, when one of the four combinations occurs. As an example, {Givet, Taket−1}
means that in time period t− 1, the system is in the High State, or Taket−1 = 1 and in time period t it is
in the Low State, or Givet = 1. Hence, when this combination occurs, we have, c (Givet −Givet−1) = c and
c (Taket − Taket−1) = −c.
{Taket, Taket−1} {Taket, Givet−1} {Givet, Givet−1} {Givet, Taket−1}
c (Taket − Taket−1) 0 c 0 −c
c (Taket −Givet−1) c 0 −c 0
c (Givet −Givet−1) 0 −c 0 c
c (Givet − Taket−1) −c 0 c 0
Figure 12: Transaction Cost Table
From this we get the expression for the transaction costs incurred, keeping in mind that in the first time
period, High State or Take criterion would always incur a cost.
Transaction Costs ≡ TC = E0
{
n∑
i=1
c {Takei0}
+
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
c
2
[|{Takeit − Takeit−1} − {Giveit −Giveit−1}|]
}
⇒ TC = E0
{
n∑
i=1
c
{
max (Bi0 + δiLi0 − Ii0, 0)
(Bi0 + δiLi0 − Ii0)
}
+
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
c
2
[∣∣∣∣{max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)(Bit + δiLit − Iit)
− max (Bit−1 + δiLit−1 − Iit−1, 0)
(Bit−1 + δiLit−1 − Iit−1)
}
−
{
max (Iit −Bit − δiLit, 0)
(Iit −Bit − δiLit)
− max (Iit−1 −Bit−1 − δiLit−1, 0)
(Iit−1 −Bit−1 − δiLit−1)
}∣∣∣∣]}
⇒ υtransaction = E0

(∑T
t=0
∑n
i=1min [Hit,max (Bit + δiLit − Iit, 0)]SitRit
)
− (TC)(∑T
t=0
∑n
i=1HitSit
)

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13.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Consider,
E
 limk→∞ 1(k)
k∑
i=1
k∑
j 6=i
σ2jυi
k∑
i=1
σ2i
 = E
 limk→∞ 1(k)
k∑
i=1
(
k∑
j=1
σ2jυi − σ2i υi
)
k∑
i=1
σ2i

= E
 limk→∞ 1(k)
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
σ2jυi −
k∑
i=1
σ2i υi
k∑
i=1
σ2i

= E
 limk→∞ 1(k)

k∑
i=1
υi −
k∑
i=1
σ2i υi
k∑
i=1
σ2i


= E [υ] ∵ E
[
lim
k→∞
1
(k)
{
k∑
i=1
(υi − υ)
}]
= 0, Using the law of large numbers.
and lim
k→∞
1
(k)
k∑
i=1
σ2i υi
k∑
i=1
σ2i
= 0, Since each of the variances and valuations are finite,
the valuations are uniformly bounded, that is,
k∑
i=1
σ2i vi ≤ (
k∑
i=1
σ2i ) ≤M
and no single one dominates the sum, expressed as,
 limk→∞max
(
σ2i
)
k∑
i=1
σ2i
→ 0 ; lim
k→∞
max
(
σ2i υi
)
k∑
i=1
σ2i υi
→ 0


Looking at the variance of the variance weighted combination,
V
 limk→∞ 1(k)
k∑
i=1
k∑
j 6=i
σ2jυi
k∑
i=1
σ2i
 = limk→∞ 1(k)
k∑
i=1
k∑
j 6=i
σ2jσ
2
i
k∑
i=1
σ2i
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= lim
k→∞
1
(k)
k∑
i=1
(
σ2i
k∑
j 6=i
σ2j
)
k∑
i=1
σ2i
= lim
k→∞
1
(k)
k∑
i=1
(
σ2i
k∑
j=1
σ2j − σ4i
)
k∑
i=1
σ2i
= lim
k→∞
1
(k)
k∑
i=1
σ2i
k∑
j=1
σ2j −
k∑
i=1
σ4i
k∑
i=1
σ2i
= lim
k→∞
1
(k)

k∑
i=1
σ2i
k∑
j=1
σ2j
k∑
i=1
σ2i
−
k∑
i=1
σ4i
k∑
i=1
σ2i

= lim
k→∞
1
(k)

k∑
j=1
σ2j −
k∑
i=1
σ4i
k∑
i=1
σ2i
 Set, σ
2 =
1
(k)
k∑
j=1
σ2j
= σ2 <∞ ∵ The Variance and the Fourth Moment are finite.
14 Appendix: Dictionary of Notation and Terminology for the Auc-
tion Strategy
• xi, the valuation of intermediary or bidder i. This is a realization of the random variable Xi which
bidder i and only bidder i knows for sure.
• xi ∼ F [0, ω], xi is symmetric and independently distributed according to the distribution F over the
interval [0, ω].
• F, is increasing and has full support, which is the non-negative real line [0,∞].
• f = F ′, is the continuous density function of F .
• xi ∼ U [0, ω] when we consider the uniform distribution.
• xi ∼ LN [0, ω] when we consider the log normal distribution.
• M, is the total number of bidders.
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• fi, Fi , are the continuous density function and distribution of bidder i in the asymmetric case.
• r ≥ 0, is the reserve price set by the auction seller.
• βi : [0, ω] → <+ is a increasing function that gives the strategy for bidder i. We let βi (xi) = bi. We
must have βi (0) = 0.
• φi ≡ β−1i is the inverse of the bidding strategy βi. This means, xi = β−1i (bi) = φi (bi).
• xi ∼ Fi [0, ωi]. Here, xi is asymmetric and is independently distributed according to the distribution
Fi over the interval [0, ωi].
• β : [0, ω]→ <+ is the strategy of all the bidders in a symmetric equilibrium. We let β (x) = b, x is the
valuation of any bidder. We also have b ≤ β (x) and β (0) = 0.
• Y1 ≡ YM−11 , the random variable that denotes the highest value, say for bidder 1, among the M − 1
other bidders.
• Y1, is the highest order statistic of X2, X3, ..., XM .
• G, is the distribution function of Y1. ∀y, G(y) = [F (y)]M−1.
• g = G′, is the continuous density function of G or Y1.
• Πi, is the payoff of bidder i. Πi =

xi − bi if bi > maxj 6=ibj
0 if bi < maxj 6=ibj
• Πs, xs is the payoff and valuation of the auction seller.
• m (x) , is the expected payment of a bidder with value x.
• Rs is the expected revenue to the seller.
• M = {1, 2, . . . ,M} is the potential set of bidders when there is uncertainty about how many interested
bidders there are.
• A ⊆ N is the set of actual bidders.
• pl is probability that any participating bidder assigns to the event that he is facing l other bidders or
that there is a total of l + 1 bidders, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M − 1}.
• Xi ∈ [0, ωi] is bidder i′s signal when the valuations are interdependent.
• Vi = υi (X1, X2, ..., XM ) is the value of the exclusive to bidder i. υi (0, 0, ..., 0) = 0
• υi (x1, x2, ..., xM ) ≡ E [Vi | X1 = x1, X2 = x2, ..., XM = xM , ] is a more general setting, where knowing
the signals of all bidders still does not reveal the full value with certainty.
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15 Appendix: Additional Auction Theory Results
The proofs for the below extensions are given in (Kashyap 2016).
15.1 Asymmetric Valuations
fi, Fi , are the continuous density function and distribution of bidder i in this case where the valuations are
asymmetric. φi ≡ β−1i is the inverse of the bidding strategy βi. This means, xi = β−1i (bi) = φi (bi). The
following result captures the scenario when we have an asymmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 6. The system of differential equations for an asymmetric equilibrium is given by
j∈{1,...,M}∑
j 6=i
{
fj (φj (b))φ
′
j (b)
Fj (φj (b))
}
=
1
[φi (b)− b]
This system of differential equations can be solved to get the bid functions for each player. Closed form
solutions are known for the case of uniform distributions with different supports. A simplification is possible
by assuming that say, some bidders have one distribution and some others have another distribution. This
is a reasonable assumption since firms with bigger sources of internal inventory would tend to differ from
those with smaller sources. Among other things, this would depend on the other divisions within a particular
intermediary and the reputation of its franchise.
Lemma 7. If, K+ 1 firms (including the one for which we derive the payoff condition) have the distribution
F1, strategy β1 and inverse function φ1. The other M − K − 1 firms have the distribution F2, strategy β2
and inverse function φ2. The system of differential equations is given by,
{
K
f1 (φ1 (b))φ
′
1 (b)
[F1 (φ1 (b))]
}
+
{
(M − 1−K) f2 (φ2 (b))φ
′
2 (b)
[F2 (φ2 (b))]
}
=
1
[φi (b)− b]
As a special case, if there are only two bidders, M = 2,K = 1 the above reduces to a system of two
differential equations,
φ′1 (b) =
[F1 (φ1 (b))]
f1 (φ1 (b)) [φ2 (b)− b]
φ′2 (b) =
[F2 (φ2 (b))]
f2 (φ2 (b)) [φ1 (b)− b]
15.2 Symmetric Interdependent Valuations
It is worth noting that a pure common value model of the sort, V = υ (X1, X2, ..., XM ) is not entirely
relevant in our context since the amount of internal inventory and the size of the borrow book will vary
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across intermediaries. This means that the amount of shares they will use from the exclusive will vary and
so will their valuations. What this reasoning tells us is that it is reasonable to expect that there is some
correlation between the signals of each bidder. This makes sense since the total supply, in a security, is
distributed across all the bidders and the valuation of the portion in the exclusive will depend on the total
supply. The valuation of a particular bidder will then depend on his inventory and how he expects the rest
of the supply to be distributed among the other bidders, resulting in a symmetric interdependent auction
strategy. From the perspective of a particular bidder, the signals of the other bidders can be interchanged
without affecting the value. This is captured using the function u (Xi, X−i) which is the same for all bidders
and is symmetric in the lastM−1 components. We assume that all signals Xi are from the same distribution
[0, ω] and that the valuations can be written as
υi (X1, X2, ..., XM ) = u (Xi, X−i)
We also assume that the joint density function of the signals f defined on [0, ω]M is symmetric and the signals
are affiliated. Affiliation here refers to the below properties.
• The random variables X1, X2, ..., XM distributed on some product of intervals X ⊂ <M according
to the joint density function f . The variables X = (X1, X2, ..., XM ) are affiliated if ∀x′,x′′ ∈ X ,
f (x′ ∨ x′′) f (x′ ∧ x′′) ≥ f (x′) f (x′′). Here x′ ∨ x′′ and x′ ∨ x′′ denote the component wise maximum
and minimum of x′ and x′′.
• The random variables Y1, Y2, ..., YM−1 denote the largest, second largest, ... , smallest from among
X2, X3, ..., XM . If X1, X2, ..., XM are affiliated, then X1, Y1, Y2, ..., YM−1 are also affiliated.
• Let G (. | x) denote the distribution of Y1 conditional on X1 = x and let g (. | x) be the associated
conditional density function. Then if Y1 and X1 are affiliated and if x′ > x then G (. | x′) dominates
G (. | x) in terms of the reverse hazard rate, g(t)G(t) . That is ∀y,
g (y | x′)
G (y | x′) ≥
g (y | x)
G (y | x)
• If γ is any increasing function, then x′ > x implies that
E [γ (Y1) | X = x′] ≥ E [γ (Y1) | X = x]
We define the below function as the expectation of the value to bidder 1 when the signal he receives is x and
the highest signal among the other bidders, Y1 = y. Because of symmetry this function is the same for all
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bidders and we assume it is strictly increasing in x. We also have u (0) = υ(0, 0) = 0.
υ (x, y) = E [V1 | X = x, Y1 = y]
Lemma 8. A symmetric equilibrium strategy governed by the set of conditions above is given by
β (x) =
∫ x
0
υ (y, y) dL (y | x)
Here, we define L (y | x) as a function with support [0, ω],
L (y | x) = exp
[
−
∫ x
y
g (t | t)
G (t | t)dt
]
Lemma 9. The bidder’s equilibrium strategy under a scenario when the valuation is the weighted average
of his valuation and the highest of the other valuations is given by the expression below. That is, we let
υ (x, y) = αx + ξy | α, ξ ∈ [0, 1]. This also implies, υ (x, y) = u (x, y) = u (xi, x−i) = αxi + ξmax (x−i),
giving us symmetry across the signals of other bidders. An alternative formulation could simply be υ (x, y) =
1
M
(
M∑
i=1
xi
)
. The affiliation structure follows the Irwin-Hall distribution (End-note 10) with bidder’s valuation
being the sum of a signal coming from a uniform distribution with ω = 1 and a common component from the
same uniform distribution.
β (x) =
[
2 (α+ ξ) (M − 1)
(2M − 1)x2M−2
]
+ (α+ ξ)
[
x− 1(
2x− 1− x22
)M−1
{
1
2M−1
+
∫ x
1
(
2y − 1− y
2
2
)M−1
dy
}]
15.3 Combined Realistic Setting
Lemma 10. The bidding strategy in a realistic setting with symmetric interdependent, uniformly distributed
valuations, with reserve prices and variable number of bidders is given by
β (x) = re−
∫ x
x∗
g(t|t)
G(t|t)dt +
∫ x
x∗
v(y, y)
g (y | y)
G (y | y)e
− ∫ x
y
g(t|t)
G(t|t)dtdy
Here, x∗ (r) is found by solving for x in the below condition
∫ 1
0
ξy
[y
x
]2(M−2)(2y
x2
)
dy +
∫ x
1
ξy

(
2y − 1− y22
)
(
2x− 1− x22
)
M−2{ 2− y(
2x− 1− x22
)} dy
 = r − αx
(M − 1)
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It is trivial to extend the above to the case where the total number of bidders is uncertain by using the
equilibrium bidding strategy βl (x) and the associated probability pl when there are exactly l + 1 bidders,
known with certainty,
βM (x) =
M−1∑
l=0
plG
l (x)
G (x)
βl (x)
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